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Improving Intergovernmental Finance: 
A Message From the Northland 
Michael J. Stutzer 
Senior Economist 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Despite its notoriously chilly winters, Minnesota is a 
very friendly state. At least, it seems so from the way the 
state's government treats its local governments. All 50 
U.S. states have some sort of intergovernmental finance 
system—programs through which the state provides 
funds and other assistance to its counties, cities, and 
school districts. But Minnesota's system is exceptional. 
This state offers its local governments just about every 
type of finance program available elsewhere, including 
payments to governments that must be spent on par-
ticular services, payments that can be spent on any-
thing, and payments to local governments' taxpayers 
rather than to the governments. Though Minnesota's 
system is arguably the most complex in the nation, that 
doesn't seem to deter its local governments. According 
to a recent study, in only four other states are local 
governments "more dependent on state aids" (Bell 
1986, p. 335). 
This generous complexity makes Minnesota a good 
state to use to illustrate a critical study of intergovern-
mental finance systems. With intermittent references to 
Minnesota, I here describe what seem to be the 
objectives and forms of such systems, evaluate how 
successful they likely are, and propose a specific change 
that could make them more successful. My general 
message to all states is to simplify—and be friendlier to 
your ultimate constituents. For Minnesota illustrates 
that, in general, these systems would be more effective 
if states paid less to their local governments and more to 
their taxpayers. 
Intergovernmental Finance: Why and How? 
A Tradeoff... 
Traditionally, economists evaluate the actions of state 
governments, like those of all other public policymak-
ing bodies, in accord with some selected mix of two 
conflicting objectives. 
One is economic efficiency. This notion is very 
different from the common idea of efficiency as getting 
the biggest bang for the buck (cost effectiveness). It 
involves instead acting in ways that affect people as 
positively as possible. 
The two basic actions of government—taxing and 
spending—affect people both directly and indirectly. 
Their direct effects are easily visible; for example, 
someone pays a large tax bill and soon thereafter is 
treated by a public hospital for cardiac arrest. But their 
indirect effects are perhaps more far-reaching. These 
include changes in the amounts people spend, save, and 
invest, which then change the amount of income they 
earn. The sum of direct and indirect effects on each 
person determines whether or not that person is better 
or worse off as a result of some tax and spending policy. 
Policymakers usually propose new policies that will 
make some people better off and others worse off; that 
is, there are both winners and losers. If that is the best 
they can do—there is no other policy that will make no 
one a loser—the proposed policy is considered efficient. 
Thus, inefficient policies are those which could be 
changed some way to make some people better off and 
no one worse off. A policy is said to be more efficient 
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than another when some people prefer the former to the 
latter and no one prefers the latter. Adoption of the 
former policy is then said to increase efficiency. 
The other traditional objective of public policies is 
equity. This is the common concept of fairness or 
justice, but in order to apply that to government actions, 
it has been refined into two operating concepts. One is 
known as vertical equity, the proposition that taxes 
should be directly related to the taxpayer's ability to 
pay, or more simply, those who have more should pay 
more. With the ability to pay measured by personal 
income or wealth or both, vertical equity is often 
equated with the adoption of progressive taxes, or a 
system in which the tax burden, expressed as a percent-
age of the ability to pay, rises with that ability. 
Decreased reliance on the opposite type of system, 
regressive taxes, has also been equated with vertical 
equity. However, note that this equating of vertical 
equity and progressivity may be somewhat arbitrary 
and, indeed, is not universally accepted. After all, mildly 
regressive taxes can still require a wealthy taxpayer to 
make larger tax payments than a less wealthy taxpayer, 
despite the fact that the former's average tax rate is 
lower than the latter's. Some argue that this is still 
vertically equitable. Attempts to justify progressive 
taxation on economic or philosophical grounds have 
been only moderately successful (Stiglitz 1987, Young 
1987). 
The other way of operationally defining equity is to 
equate it with the proposition that similar taxpayers in 
similar circumstances should bear the same tax burden, 
a concept dubbed horizontal equity. This, of course, 
requires decisions about what similar means in terms of 
taxpayers and their circumstances (not to mention their 
tax burdens). For example, one might argue that two 
residents of equal ability to pay who receive the same 
amount of public services in the cities they live in should 
pay the same amount of city taxes. One would then be 
arguing that differentiating tax burdens only on the 
basis of the city lived in is not horizontally equitable. 
Unfortunately, attaining efficiency and equity simul-
taneously is often difficult for public policymakers. 
That is because few policies affect just one or the other 
of these objectives or both in the direction desired. 
Often, policies desirable on equity grounds are ineffi-
cient. For example, some have argued that highly pro-
gressive personal taxes, while perhaps highly vertically 
equitable, cause disincentives to work and save. These 
disincentives may lower the rate of economic growth. 
If an alternative policy promoting higher economic 
growth and sharing the wealth could benefit everyone, 
the highly progressive tax would be inefficient. Similar-
ly, policies that are efficient may be inequitable. Poli-
cymakers usually, therefore, trade off some degree of 
one objective for some degree of the other, to achieve 
what they consider the best possible, or optimal mix of 
the two. 
To represent tradeoffs involved in trying to simulta-
neously attain efficiency and equity, economists often 
use the concept of a social welfare function. To simplify 
a bit, this concept assumes that policymakers choose 
their optimal policies as if they weighed individuals' 
own opinions about the alternatives. But individual 
opinions are not necessarily assumed to be equally 
weighted in this process. Policymakers with a strong 
preference for vertical equity, for example, can be 
assumed to attach much higher weights to the views of 
the poor than to those of the rich. By assuming that 
policymakers act as if they choose a policy which 
maximizes a social welfare function, economists can 
capture the notion that policymakers strive to attain 
their most desired mix of efficiency and equity.
1 
... Across Governmental Boundaries 
One way to strive for that end in a state is for the state's 
government to help finance its local governments. For if 
local governments tax and spend independently, and 
the state intervenes in no other way, the desired mix of 
efficiency and equity for all the state's residents is not 
likely to be achieved. This is because, in a decentralized 
system, the actions of local governments will be chosen 
with only the welfare of its local residents in mind, but 
those actions will nevertheless also affect the welfare of 
others in the state. 
To formalize this general problem, Gordon (1983) 
assumes that each governmental unit in a decentralized 
public finance system adopts its own tax policy to 
finance the provision of services collectively consumed 
by society (public goods).
2 In doing so, each governmen-
tal unit adopts a tax/service provision policy as if it 
maximizes the welfare of only residents of its communi-
ty. Gordon contrasts the resulting decentralized tax and 
spending policy with what he calls the "fully coordi-
1 Normally, economists recommend avoiding the tradeoff by choosing the 
most equitable policy among policies that are efficient. However, that is not 
possible here or wherever there are distorting taxes and constraints requiring 
that individuals of identical type receive equal utility in equilibrium. Tradeoffs 
will have to be made. 
2The viewpoint here is that user fees could and should be used to finance 
excludable public services, like garbage collection (public services that can 
easily be provided only to those who want to pay for them). Property and other 
taxes are assumed to be used to finance nonexcludable public services, such as 
public safety (those that if provided to some will unavoidably benefit all). 
3 nated" policy resulting from a central government 
maximizing the welfare of all communities' residents. 
This lets Gordon identify seven types of side effects of 
the taxing and spending of a representative local 
governmental unit in a decentralized system, side 
effects that are likely to reduce efficiency and equity in 
the larger society (Gordon 1983, p. 580): 
1. Nonresidents may pay some of the taxes. 
2. Nonresidents may receive some of the 
benefits from public services. 
3. Congestion costs faced by nonresidents may 
change. 
4. Tax revenues received in other communities 
may change due to the spillover of economic 
activity. 
5. Resource costs for public services in other 
communities may change. 
6. Output and factor price changes may favor 
residents over nonresidents. 
7. Distributional effects among nonresidents 
would be ignored. 
These side effects are perhaps best illustrated by a 
single, albeit somewhat contrived, example. Suppose a 
city council decides to build a convention center, 
financed by a tax levied on bar and restaurant sales in 
the city. Nonresidents who regularly entertain in the 
city will, indeed, pay this sales tax (Gordon's side effect 
1). But the city council argues that this really is not so 
bad because many of these nonresidents have long 
benefited, free, from the fine city parks maintained by 
city residents' taxes (2). After the convention center is 
built, heavy conventioneer traffic between the airport 
and the center causes traffic congestion and noise, 
harming nonresidents as well as residents (3). But some 
nonresidents who used to travel to the city to entertain 
now avoid the traffic and the new sales tax by enter-
taining in their hometowns instead, thus stimulating the 
growth of commercial tax revenues there (4). Of course, 
this new wining and dining near home creates a need for 
a few more police near the busier bistros (5). Back in the 
city, the convention center creates a heavy demand for 
low-skilled, part-time workers, slightly driving up 
wages paid to all similar workers, most of whom live in 
the city (6). Because nonresident drinkers tend to have 
lower-than-average incomes, the city sales tax on bars 
and restaurants regressively taxes nonresidents (7). 
In this example, the decentralized decision to adopt a 
local selective sales tax won't be part of the tax and 
spending policy that would maximize the welfare of all 
state residents unless the seven effects on the well-being 
of nonresidents of the local community sum to zero. 
This is quite unlikely—here and more generally. So 
some intergovernmental policy that confronts those 
side effects may increase aggregate social welfare, that 
is, will help attain a more desirable mix of efficiency 
and equity in the society as a whole. In the example, an 
appropriate intergovernmental policy might be to sim-
ply prohibit the adoption of the selective sales tax. But 
the existence of the intercommunity side effects doesn't 
justify any arbitrary intergovernmental finance system. 
To be an improvement, such a system would have to 
prevent or neutralize the side effects without introduc-
ing more severe inefficiencies and inequities of its own. 
The Minnesota Sample 
In the United States, a variety of intergovernmental 
finance programs have developed which have the 
potential to improve efficiency and equity in a state. 
Minnesota may have adopted them all at some time in 
the past 20 years, so a thumbnail sketch of its evolution 
will reveal at least their major forms. 
One of the first programs Minnesota adopted (in 
1967) is the homestead credit. In this program, the state 
pays local governments a fixed percentage of a home-
owner's property tax bill (up to a ceiling amount) before 
the homeowner receives the bill. The local government 
then credits the homeowner for this payment, which 
lowers the amount of the tax bill. This way, the property 
taxpayer cannot convert the credit into cash. Minnesota 
has changed, several times, both the percentage of 
property taxes paid and the ceiling amount. The 
homestead credit cost the state over $580 million in 
1986. 
In adopting the homestead credit, Minnesota was 
substituting the progressive state income tax (the source 
of the state payments) for what was presumed to be a 
sharply regressive local property tax, a substitution 
which the state hoped would improve the vertical equity 
of its tax system.
3 That such a credit is justified—that 
local residents wouldn't pay taxes that are vertically 
equitable statewide without state intervention—is not 
immediately obvious. For in a decentralized system, 
local governments would be free to adopt their own 
3 When Minnesota adopted its homestead credit, the property tax was 
generally believed to be quite regressive. (See, for example, Netzer 1966.) Since 
then, the degree of regressivity has been questioned on the basis of flaws in 
empirical studies and the suggestion that the burden may also be partly borne by 
relatively wealthy owners of nonresidential capital. (See Peterson 1973.) 
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local taxes, including progressive income taxes. But 
again, in doing so, each local government would only 
worry about vertical equity among its own taxpayers, 
an illustration of Gordon's side effect 7. As such, 
wealthier taxpayers in a state's wealthier communities 
would not be tapped to help pay for the services used by 
less wealthy taxpayers in less wealthy communities. In 
fact, in a decentralized system, the possibility of being 
more heavily taxed simply to distribute a community's 
wealth more equitably might encourage the wealthy to 
congregate: after all, the vertically equitable tax burden 
of a wealthy person would no doubt be lighter in a 
community of wealthy people than in a more diverse 
community. This movement of the wealthy to such 
enclaves, in order to minimize their tax burdens, 
illustrates Gordon's side effect 4. And in some com-
munities with broad wealth distributions, just the fear of 
this potential tax base loss might impede the implemen-
tation of taxes considered vertically equitable. 
So, to the extent a state wants to attain a statewide 
notion of vertical equity, it may need to use a statewide, 
vertically equitable tax to help finance local govern-
ment services, as Minnesota has tried to do with its 
homestead credit. Of course, any state's ability to 
achieve its desired degree of statewide vertical equity is 
limited by the ability of wealthier taxpayers to move to 
other states, another illustration of Gordon's side effect 
4. If federal policymakers believe that such movement 
stymies vertical equity nationally, the federal govern-
ment could substitute federally raised vertically equita-
ble taxes for state and local taxes. 
Since its adoption of the homestead credit, Minnesota 
has added other property tax credits as well. Like the 
homestead credit, these are paid directly to local 
governments in an attempt to lower some groups' net 
payments. Taxpayers cannot convert these into cash, 
either. The costliest of these other credits is the state 
school agricultural credit, eligible to farmers and own-
ers of private vacation cabins. It is intended to remedy a 
perceived inequity that these groups pay more than 
their fair share of school costs.
4 This credit cost the state 
over $126 million in 1986. 
An even costlier program than property tax credits is 
Minnesota's categorical aids to local education, that is, 
funds which the state specifies must be spent on 
education. These effectively began in 1971 when the 
state started paying a big share of local school district 
costs. Put very roughly, it does this by paying districts 
funds intended to bring spending per pupil in the state 
up to a target level. In 1986, categorical aids to local 
school districts cost Minnesota over $1.1 billion. 
Like its credits, Minnesota's categorical aids were 
partly motivated by state officials' desire to substitute 
state taxes for local property taxes, which were thought 
to be less vertically equitable. These state aids can also 
be viewed as an attempt to remedy a perceived horizon-
tal inequity of a decentralized system. In that system, 
the property tax rate necessary to educate identical 
students would differ across school districts in the state. 
With the cost of education services identical, districts 
with low property tax bases would have higher property 
tax rates than districts with high property tax bases. 
Identical households would therefore pay more for 
identical education services in a poorer district than in 
a wealthier district, an apparent horizontal inequity. 
Decentralized systems may have no mechanism for 
remedying this.
5 Minnesota attempts to remedy it by 
providing more aid to the needier districts so that per-
pupil spending across school districts is more equal. 
While other states have adopted this type of aid, by the 
way, they have not always done so voluntarily; it has 
been strongly encouraged by judicial decisions (Long 
1973). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, state aids to 
education can be viewed as an attempt to remedy 
inefficiency. Once educated, students are free to move 
anywhere they want, including outside their school 
4This credit is difficult to justify as a remedy for any of Gordon's side 
effects. The rationale for farm relief in Minnesota was that farmers own large 
amounts of taxed land, so would pay higher property taxes than the typical 
resident or small business owner who shares roughly the same personal benefits 
from local public spending. A similar rationale was used to justify relief for 
owners of private vacation cabins. But this argument could also be used by 
owners of large office buildings and factories or by residents without children to 
justify paying no school taxes, since they also pay disproportionately compared 
to the direct personal benefits received. The principle of the property tax is that 
ability to pay is measured, at least in part, by property wealth. Vertical equity 
requires that those with more wealth pay more tax, in order to finance 
nonexcludable public services like education. The state's rationale for the state 
school agricultural credit seems to imply that taxes should not be based on 
ability to pay, but rather on direct benefits received. 
5Hamilton (1976) disagrees. He has argued that full market capitalization 
of the intracommunity differences in residents' property values would prevent 
the horizontal inequity. To see this, suppose a school district has only one family 
that lives in a big house; all its other families live in small houses. Someone 
might argue that the big-house family's schoolchildren are disadvantaged 
because their school district property tax base is almost wholly made up of 
low-valued homes, which keeps their school tax rate higher than it would be in a 
homogeneous district of big houses. But if that were true, why wouldn't the 
family move to a district filled with big houses? If such moves aren't observed, 
Hamilton argues, it is probably because the market value of the big house has 
already fallen to reflect the disadvantage of the higher tax rate; that is, full 
capitalization has occurred. As such, the owner of the big house was already 
fully compensated (by a lower home price) for this disadvantage, freeing 
sufficient resources for the owner to remedy the horizontal inequity. This 
argument depends on fiscal differences being fully capitalized into home 
values. While Oates (1969) presents some empirical evidence that local 
expenditures are capitalized, the issue is not yet settled. 
5 district. People in one district may thus benefit from the 
presence of people educated in another district, which 
nevertheless would bear the full cost of education in a 
decentralized system. This is an illustration of Gordon's 
side effect 2. In addition, residents without children may 
have an incentive to move to communities with lower 
education taxes, thereby becoming nonresidents who 
can reap the benefits from people educated elsewhere. 
The resulting movement of tax base from school 
districts with higher education taxes to those with lower 
education taxes is an illustration of Gordon's side effect 
4. Due to effects 2 and 4, the likely result of decentraliza-
tion would be underfunding of education in a state, that 
is, lower school spending statewide than is efficient. 
Minnesota also provides categorical aids to county 
governments for the provision of public health and 
welfare programs, such as medical assistance and 
income maintenance for the poor. In 1986, the state 
paid counties over $600 million to assist programs like 
these. 
The justification for such aids is by now familiar. In a 
decentralized system, nonpoor taxpayers would have 
an incentive to move to communities with few poor 
residents, thus escaping local taxes levied for health and 
welfare services. In order to prevent this, communities 
with a mix of nonpoor and poor would probably have to 
tax and spend less for these services than would result in 
a fully coordinated system; these services, too, would be 
underfunded. This is another illustration of Gordon's 
side effect 4. Some form of state categorical aid for 
these services might therefore produce a more desirable 
mix of efficiency and equity than a decentralized sys-
tem would. 
Besides categorical aids for education, public health, 
and welfare, Minnesota also gives its municipalities 
(and to a much lesser extent, its counties) lump-sum 
appropriations which can be spent on most anything the 
local government chooses. The main appropriation, 
called simply local government aid, is a formula-based 
revenue-sharing system. In 1986, the state paid close to 
$300 million in lump-sum appropriations. 
Minnesota started its local revenue-sharing system 
in 1971 and since then has changed its formula three 
times, so the intent of the aid is hard to determine. But 
two reasons for it are often still given. One is the 
aforementioned desire to relieve local property taxes, 
by substituting state revenue sources presumed to be 
more vertically equitable. The other reason is the desire 
to help remedy the type of horizontal inequity that 
seems to justify school aids. Due to the geographic 
dispersion of property, communities with substantial 
property wealth can spread the property tax burden 
more thinly over their residents than other communities 
can. In a decentralized system, then, residents of 
different communities may bear different tax burdens, 
even when their personal income, wealth, and use of 
public services are the same. This perceived inequity 
has been invoked to justify local revenue-sharing 
formulas, which are tailored to remedy such inequity. 
(But look back at footnote 5 for an alternative view.) 
While all the credits and aids detailed so far are paid 
to local governments, Minnesota has one much smaller 
program that pays funds directly to people. That pro-
gram is called the property tax refund, and it pays 
renters and homeowners who have relatively little 
income and wealth. Payments are determined by a 
formula based on the person's income and property tax 
bill. That bill is strongly correlated with the home-
owner's property value and is imputed for renters from 
landlords' tax bills. The property tax refund cost the 
state around $160 million in 1986. It is clearly yet 
another attempt to increase vertical equity. 
How Well? 
A Likely Inefficiency... 
So, Minnesota's intergovernmental finance system il-
lustrates the variety of state programs used generally to 
try to improve statewide equity and efficiency. Again, 
these include categorical aids paid to local govern-
ments and earmarked for particular services, lump-sum 
appropriations and property tax credits paid to local 
governments but not earmarked, and property tax relief 
funds paid directly to less wealthy residents. Recall, 
though, that for such programs to be an improvement 
over a decentralized system, they must not have more 
severe side effects of their own. That may not be true for 
some of these programs. 
To begin to see why this is so, imagine you are 
invited by a stranger to a posh French restaurant for 
lunch. After being seated at Monsieur Kelly's, the 
stranger insists on paying for your lunch, no matter 
what it costs, as long as you agree to pay for the 
stranger's. Not wanting to go hungry, you agree to the 
terms and decide to order a more desirable, expensive 
lunch than you would have otherwise. After all, you 
reason, the stranger is paying for it and will probably do 
the same because you are paying for the stranger's 
lunch. If you don't order a more desirable, expensive 
lunch, you run the risk that the stranger will anyway, 
and you will have paid for more than you got. Neither of 
you wants to run that risk. So the total bill for the two of 
you exceeds what it would have had you gone Dutch. 
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A similar result can be expected when hungry 
governments and their taxpayers are involved. In a state 
that offers to finance some local government spending, 
the cost of the services provided primarily for any 
community's residents is spread among all the state's 
residents. Thus, each community's residents only pay, 
through local tax levies, for a small share of their own 
local government lunch. But at the same time, each 
community's residents must pay, through state tax 
levies, for a share of the spending of other local 
governments on services provided in other communi-
ties. With all of a state's local governments striving to 
serve their communities lunch, this system, just like the 
stranger's at Monsieur Kelly's, encourages more total 
spending than would occur otherwise. 
Of course, this analogy is not flawless. But you 
needn't buy the analogy in order to swallow its point. 
For there is a substantial amount of theoretical and 
empirical support for the proposition that intergovern-
mental payments increase total government spending. 
The theoretical arguments attribute the increase to 
two basic phenomena. One is known as the price or 
matching grant effect. This simply is that when services 
cost a local government less (when their "price" drops) 
because the state pays a part of their cost (de facto 
provides matching funds), the local government is 
likely to buy more. (See, for example, Wilde 1971.) The 
price effect may have occurred, for example, with 
property tax credits like Minnesota's. In the past, when 
Minnesota local governments have increased spending 
for local services, the state has paid part of the extra cost 
by increasing property tax credit payments to local 
governments. The rest of the cost has been paid for by 
local taxpayers. The homestead credit payment for 
homeowning taxpayers, for instance, has reduced the 
extra taxes they would otherwise have been charged by 
more than 50 percent (up to a maximum amount). By 
reducing the price of additional local services, credits 
structured in this way theoretically made it easier for 
local governments to spend more than they would have 
without the price reduction. 
In an attempt to end this price or matching grant 
effect, Minnesota's legislature recently changed its 
homestead and agricultural school property tax credits. 
Again, previously the state agreed to pay a fixed 
percentage of taxpayers' property tax bills (up to a 
ceiling amount). This guaranteed that the state would 
pay a sizable percentage of the property tax increases 
adopted by local governments. The change converts 
this open-ended commitment to a closed-ended appro-
priation. 
While the intent of this change is to end the matching 
grant effect, I doubt it will. Recall that one of the main 
motivations of the property tax credits is the state's 
desire to substitute state taxes for what it considers to be 
very regressive local property taxes. As long as this 
substitution is a priority, the legislature will respond to a 
credible threat of statewide local property tax increases 
by providing more property tax relief. While the relief 
might be delayed until after the property taxes increase, 
the result will still likely be higher appropriations for 
property tax credits to reduce property tax bills—a 
matching grant effect. 
But suppose that property tax credits were structured 
in another way, so that they don't have a matching grant 
effect. Then would the credits—or any other intergovern-
mental finance program without obvious matching 
features, such as Minnesota's local government aid to 
municipalities—still result in higher local spending? 
Some say yes, primarily because of the other basic 
phenomenon, the intriguing flypaper effect. This theory 
rests on the general notion that, due to imperfections in 
the political process, local officials can easily spend a 
larger share of intergovernmental aid than the tax-
paying local electorate would like.
6 Officials can do 
this, the argument goes, because they set the agenda for 
public discussion about the disposition of revenues in 
their possession; they can simply structure this agenda 
to let them spend more than the public desires.
7 In other 
words, as long as intergovernmental aid is paid directly 
to local governments, it will tend to stick there (like 
flypaper), to support more spending, rather than be 
passed back to local taxpayers as tax relief. The local 
government spending that results is likely to be more 
than would occur if the funds were instead paid directly 
to local taxpayers, as an addition to their disposable 
income, so that local officials had to explicitly increase 
taxes in order to increase spending. 
Largely independent of these theoretical arguments, 
statistical analyses have confirmed their conclusion. 
These studies have separated the effects of intergovern-
mental finance from other plausible factors influencing 
government spending. Gramlich (1977) surveys 35 
such studies, which included a variety of federal and 
state intergovernmental finance programs that involved 
6See, for example, McGuire 1973 or Niskanen 1975 for expositions of the 
view that public officials may have goals which conflict with the public's. 
7Romer and Rosenthal (1979) have developed a theory of agenda-setting 
officials. Craig and Inman (1986) examine the empirical implications of 
Shepsle's (1979) more elaborate model of the political process, which includes 
agenda-setting. Alternative theories for this phenomenon have been proposed 
by Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld (1979) and Hamilton (1983). 
7 aid both with and without obvious matching grant 
features. He finds no evidence that intergovernmental 
aid paid to state and local governments was used solely 
for state and local tax relief. Rather, the governments 
receiving the aid always increased their spending. In 
fact, often intergovernmental aid resulted in no tax 
decreases at all. Rather, governments receiving aid 
actually increased their spending by more than the 
amount of aid, requiring tax increases. This prospect 
seems to be less likely for intergovernmental aid 
without obvious matching grant features. But that aid 
typically still resulted in higher government spending 
than occurred when taxpayers' income rose by an equal 
amount, as it would have, had aid been paid directly to 
them. 
A recent study of how Minnesota's intergovern-
mental finance system has affected its local govern-
ments is consistent with Gramlich's nationwide survey. 
Bell and Bowman (1986) examine the effects of both 
Minnesota's property tax credits and its local govern-
ment aid (its local lump-sum revenue-sharing system) 
on the property tax levies of 174 Minnesota municipali-
ties. While both of these programs may have been 
intended, in part, to relieve property taxes, Bell and 
Bowman's results indicate that both instead actually 
increased them—here, the municipal property tax levies 
net of credits, the bottom-line payment required of 
municipal property taxpayers. Furthermore, Bell and 
Bowman find that the tax increase associated with 
credits, which have matching grant effects, exceeded 
the increase associated with local government aid. 
These tax increases suggest, of course, that these forms 
of Minnesota's intergovernmental finance system have 
increased local government spending in the state well 
beyond what it would have been otherwise. 
This increased local government spending may not 
be a negative side effect if it is all on services that, 
without state intervention, would be systemically under-
funded because of their intercommunity side effects-
education, public health, and welfare services, for 
example. Then, besides remedying inequities, as de-
fined by the state, the increased spending could be 
improving statewide efficiency by raising the level of 
these services to the desired optimal level. However, 
that would not be true if the state funds are spent on 
other local services instead—on things like local gar-
bage collection and fire protection—which would not 
likely be underfunded otherwise because they primarily 
benefit only the residents/taxpayers of the community 
providing them. While state aid that increases local 
government spending on such services might improve 
equity in the state, it would reduce efficiency by 
systemically overfunding them. State taxpayers could 
then be made better off by some pattern of tax re-
ductions or rebates giving them the freedom to spend 
the extra dollars as they choose—which may or may not 
include higher levels of these services. 
As Minnesota's intergovernmental finance system 
illustrated, many of the types of programs that states 
now use to provide funds for local government spending 
do not specify how their funds are to be spent. Many 
U.S. intergovernmental finance systems thus provide 
quite a lot of funds that have the potential to be spent 
inefficiently. 
Indeed, this potential seems to be realized in 
Minnesota. The Bell and Bowman study, remember, 
suggests that local government spending in the state is 
greater than it would be without state intervention. The 
local governmental units in this study are Minnesota 
municipalities—those which, along with counties, are 
primary providers of the types of local services that 
mainly benefit local residents, so are not likely to be 
systemically underfunded. The increased spending sug-
gested by this study—as well as others cited by 
Gramlich (1977)—therefore also suggests that some 
services are being overfunded in Minnesota. 
That seems to be corroborated by the most recent 
data available on state and local government spending 
(U.S. 1986, pp. 199-250). That data show that per 
capita municipal and county government spending for 
all services other than public welfare, health, and 
hospitals was 45 percent higher in Minnesota than in 
the nation's median state. This has occurred despite 
levy limitations placed on Minnesota municipalities. 
The high ranking must be interpreted cautiously, 
though. It may partly reflect cost differentials or public 
preferences for higher spending. Or in some states, 
municipal and county spending might be less than in 
Minnesota just because these governmental units shoul-
der less of the service burden there. Yet, if this were a 
widespread phenomenon, the per capita spending of 
municipal, county, and state governments combined 
should not have been higher in Minnesota than in the 
median state. And it was, by 25 percent. Meanwhile, per 
capita property taxes in Minnesota—which many of its 
intergovernmental programs were intended to lower— 
were still 21 percent higher than in the median state. It 
thus seems reasonable to infer that some of this higher-
than-average local government spending in Minnesota 
is excessive. 
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. . . With a Simple Solution 
The remedy for intergovernmental finance systems that 
encourage inefficiently high levels of local government 
spending is fairly simple, but sweeping. Basically, it is to 
separate the funds intended to improve efficiency in a 
state from those intended to improve equity and to 
redirect funds so they are more likely to achieve their 
goals. 
States can continue to give funds intended to im-
prove efficiency to their local governments. States 
should require local governments to spend additional 
funds only on services that are likely to be underfunded 
otherwise. Again, public education, health, and welfare 
services come to mind. 
Such a change should leave many local governments 
with smaller amounts of state funds than they receive 
now and less ability to inefficiently overspend them. 
Presumably, the excess amount of state funds was 
provided to improve equity among residents, and this 
goal can still be pursued. Rather than giving such funds 
to local governments, which could result in excessive 
local spending, however, states should give them direct-
ly to their residents. After all, the funds should be used 
to help people, not their governments. Practically, if 
states want to try to preserve whatever degree of equity 
they now enjoy, they could transfer from local govern-
ments to their residents whatever share of their existing 
funds they do not give to local governments for effi-
ciency purposes. If states want to try to attain some 
other degrees of equity, they could design an appropri-
ate formula for making direct payments to residents. 
One way to design such a formula is described in my 
Appendix, but the general idea of paying people instead 
of governments is not new. In Minnesota, for example, it 
has been proposed by the highly respected Citizens 
League (1987). 
In Conclusion 
Some type of intergovernmental finance system can be 
justified on both efficiency and equity grounds. But 
some current state systems let local governments in-
efficiently overspend. Transferring some state aid from 
these governments to local residents could solve that 
problem while preserving or enhancing equity. 
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How to Pass the SALT 
A state that wants to improve equity among its taxpayers by 
giving them state funds faces a difficult task. It obviously can't 
just budget a fixed amount of funds and give equal shares to 
all residents. It will have to decide how to distribute funds to 
try to achieve each type of equity: horizontal and vertical. (See 
the preceding paper.) And it likely can't achieve both of those 
completely; some tradeoff of the two will usually be neces-
sary. Here I describe a general method states can use to 
construct a formula for distributing the aid so that, given their 
equity budget, they can attain whatever tradeoff they choose. 
Forgive me, but for ease in reference, I call this a formula for 
passing the SALT (state aid to local taxpayers). 
Assumptions 
In deriving this method, assumptions about the burden of local 
taxes are crucial. As discussed in the preceding paper, besides 
horizontal and vertical equity, states must also trade off their 
equity and efficiency objectives. Tax changes motivated by 
equity objectives affect efficiency in a state, thus adding to the 
public's tax burden. If a state considers this and still wants to 
pursue equity objectives, its assumptions about who actually 
bears the tax burden will determine the equity it will try to 
achieve. For instance, the usual case mustered for vertically 
equitable property tax relief for poor renters assumes that 
rental property taxes are fully passed forward into aggregate 
rental payments, rather than backward into the landlord's 
return on investment. And one view of horizontal inequity 
depends on tax and spending differentials not being fully 
capitalized into property values (as described in footnote 5 of 
the paper). 
My purpose here is to merely describe a general method 
for constructing a SALT formula, not to recommend a 
particular formula. Still, to illustrate the method, I must make 
some assumptions about tax burdens in a hypothetical public 
finance system. I simply choose three that are often used (but 
not necessarily valid): taxes on rental housing are wholly 
borne by tenants; property taxes on other business property 
are wholly borne by business, not shifted to consumers or 
workers; and tax and spending differentials are not capitalized 
into property values. 
Due to that last assumption, property tax base differences 
among local taxing units in the system create the horizontal 
inequity described in the paper. To see how to remedy it, 
consider a central taxing unit with a system that has no 
classification or credits. For simplicity, lump all property into 
two categories—housing and business—and assume that the 
central taxing unit wants to pay SALT only to residents and 
not to business owners. Let k represent a particular local 
taxing unit, and adopt the following notation for its pertinent 
characteristics: 
Iik = the current taxable income of the ith resident 
Hik = the taxable assessed value of the ith resident's 
owner-occupied housing (if any) 
Bk = the taxable assessed value of the business 
property 
Rik = the SALT payment to resident i 
mk = the property tax rate 
popk = the population size 
Tk = the total property tax collections 
K = the per capita property tax base 
= (XlHik + B)/popk. 
Consider the state as a hypothetical central taxing unit 
containing the total property tax base XkVkpopk and raising 
total property tax revenues T = ZkmkVkpopk. Dividing the 
latter by the former yields a statewide average mill rate m. 
Aiming for Horizontal Equity 
To achieve one concept of horizontal equity among residents, 
the state must equalize the effective net (of SALT) property 
tax rate paid by residents of all local taxing units. To do so, the 
state should first compute what a resident's effective tax rate 
would have been had the local taxing unit spent the same 
amount per capita as the state. Per capita spending in the state 
is 
(1) Tl Xkpopk = mXkVkpopk/Xkpopk 
while per capita spending in taxing unit k is 
(2) Tk/popk = mkVk. 
Equate (1) and (2) and solve for the hypothetical tax rate m*k 
which would have given unit k the statewide aggregate per 
capita spending: 
(3) m*k = m( XkVkpopJ Xkpopk )/Vk. 
For horizontal equity (h), the state must provide a SALT 
payment R\ to make m\ = m. The net (of SALT) effective 
property tax rate paid by resident i is (m*kHik—R
hik )/Hik, or 
(4) m\ — (R
hiklHik). 
Equating (4) and m and substituting (3) yields the SALT 
transfer R
hik required to achieve horizontal equity: 
(5) Rlk = Hlkm[(XkVkpopk/Xkpopk)
 - Vk]/Vk 
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(6) R?k/Hik = m[(XkVkpopk/Xkpopk)
 ~ Vk]/Vk. 
Thus, to achieve horizontal equity, SALT payments must 
be proportional to the residents' home value. The proportion-
ality factor is the product of the statewide average mill rate m 
and the percentage deviation of the statewide average per 
capita tax base from unit &'s per capita tax base. Were this 
formula adopted, residents of units with below-average tax 
bases would receive positive SALT payments while residents 
of units with above-average bases would be docked. States 
that want to avoid negative SALT transfers can do so, but only 
by accepting more horizontal inequity for any fixed budget or 
by expanding the budget to attain more horizontal equity. 
Aiming for Vertical Equity 
Under my simplifying assumptions, the property tax system is 
proportional without SALT. Another purpose of SALT is to 
achieve the state's concept of vertical equity, perhaps serving 
as an alternative to property tax credits. For example, the state 
may strive to use SALT to achieve some target level of 
progressivity. 
To show how this can be done, I must first define what is 
meant by a target level of progressivity. And in doing so, I must 
settle on a reasonable measure of ability to pay. For that 
measure, rather than either current income or current property 
wealth, a combination of the two could be used. Taxpayer 
income could be estimated from individual income tax filings 
(in states that levy income taxes), but estimating taxpayer 
property wealth is not so easy. While local property tax 
assessors estimate the value of taxpayer homes, they don't 
estimate the value of the taxpayer's equity in those homes, and 
increases in that are what increase the taxpayer's wealth. 
Because of this difficulty, property wealth could just be 
ignored or, as an approximation, national estimates of the 
equity share of housing value could be used for homeowner 
property wealth. The resulting estimated property wealth 
could be converted into a flow of imputed property income 
(by multiplying it by a suitable current market interest rate) 
and then added to ordinary taxpayer income to get what I'll 
call full income. This process results in an imputed property 
income proportional to property value. If c is the proportion-
ality constant, then full income is 
(7) Yik = Iik + cHik. 
To define the level of progressivity, the state may choose 
any increasing function/for the net (of SALT) effective tax 
rate: 
(8) mHik/(Yik+Rik)=f(Yik). 
Solving for Rik yields the solution for vertical equity (v): 
(9) RJk = [mHik/f(Yik)]-Yik. 
A substitution from (7) makes this 
(10) Rjk/Hik = [m/f(Yik)] - (Iik/Hik) - c. 
This can be manipulated to achieve a state's particular 
goals. For example, if the state wants the net effective tax rate 
to rise at a linear rate per dollar of full income, denoted a, it 
would make this SALT payment: 
(11) Ryk = (mHik/aYik)-Yik. 
Here Rjk clearly falls with increases in the current income 
component Iik of Yik. 
Just as did (5), (9) might require negative transfers, that is, 
payments from some state residents. Those residents would 
have sufficiently high ratios of current income to imputed 
property income to make (10) negative. Again, states that 
want to avoid negative SALT transfers could do so at the cost 
of less vertical equity or additional budgetary outlays. 
Weighting the Equities 
A comparison of (5) and (9) reveals the likelihood of a 
tradeoff in achieving both horizontal and vertical equity: they 
require different formulas. Furthermore, the state has only a 
fixed budget of state revenues Q to distribute and, suppose, 
doesn't want to allow negative SALT transfers. How, then, 
can the state produce a desirable distribution of SALT? 
The best it can do is to produce a SALT distribution by 






(14) Rik> 0 
for all i, K where w is the state's desired weighting of vertical 
equity relative to horizontal equity. Problem (12) minimizes 
the (weighted) sum of squared deviations of nonnegative 
SALT payments from their ideal target levels. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which are sufficient for a 
global minimum to the convex problem (12), are 
(15) (1+* - (R
hik + wR?k) + \-»ik = 0 
(16) \(XjXiRj-Q) =0 
(17) m,A = 0 
(18) X,Ml*>0 
for all i, k. 
Multiply (15) by Rik and substitute (17) to obtain 
(19) \Rik = (R*!k+wRvk)Rik - (1 +w)R}k. 
For all residents receiving positive SALT payments Rik > 0, 
dubbed eligible residents, divide (19) to obtain 
(20) k = (R>}k+wRvk) - (1 +w)Rik. 
11 Thus, for any two eligible residents, use (20) and rearrange to 
obtain 
(21) Rik - Rji = [(R^+wRj,) - (Rfr+wRjM 1+w) 
which proves that eligible residents with a higher target sum 
(Rh+wRh) receive a larger SALT payment than those with a 
smaller target sum. Number eligible residents in order of the 
size of their respective target sums, denoted S. Then (21) can 
be rewritten as 
(22) Ri+l = Rt + A 
where 
(23) Q = ($+,-$)/(1+w) 
is the difference in payments between residents i + 1 and i and 
R{ is the SALT payment (yet to be determined) to the resident 
with the highest target sum. Note that (22) has a simple 
solution: 
(24) Rj = RX + %l\Dk 
for 7 = 2,..., N. 
The only part of the solution remaining is to determine /?, 
and N, the number of eligible residents. Rao Aiyagari has 
recently proposed a simple algorithm for determining this: 
search for N such that 
(25) SjvXl/AotSLsi-d+^e] > W 
Then all residents numbered N or lower receive aid calculated 
by (24). Those numbered higher than TV, which include those 
with negative target sums, are ineligible for payments. It can 
then be shown that (1+w)/?! equals S\ minus the middle term 
of (25). 
Implementation and Modification 
To implement this scheme, the state need only gather 
information sufficient to compute the target levels (5) and (9) 
or (11). This is easily done by having residents file for SALT 
when they file their state income taxes. Their property tax 
records, an estimated equity share factor, and current interest 
rates can then be used in conjunction with the income tax 
filings to impute full income for each resident. The taxing unit 
for a resident would be the overlapping districts containing 
the resident. After settling on a measure of the desired degree 
of progressivity—for example, the constant a in (11)—and the 
desired weight factor w, the state would calculate (5), (11), 
and the solution to (12)—(14). Finally, the state would mail to 
its residents the checks determined by the solution. 
This general method can be adjusted in many ways to 
construct formulas valid for assumptions other than those in 
my illustration. Five types of adjustments quickly come to 
mind: 
• Change my early simplifying assumptions. For instance, 
more sophisticated assumptions about who actually 
bears the tax burdens could be adopted to more accu-
rately assess those burdens. 
• Change my implicit assumption about service cost 
differences among taxing units. I assumed they don't 
matter for horizontal equity. If they do, less aid would be 
needed for residents in lower cost districts. To reflect 
that, formula (5) could be rederived to incorporate es-
timated service cost differentials. 
• Use more complicated objective functions. For example, 
a quadratic penalty term penalizing large deviations 
from residents' previous net tax bills could be added. 
Experimenting with different penalty weights would let 
the state achieve a politically feasible mix of horizontal 
and vertical equity, should the optimum prove impos-
sible to adopt. 
• Use other important structural features of the tax system 
to derive (5) and (9). Obvious ones are the deductability 
of the property tax from state income taxes and the 
existence of classification and credits. 
• Use other well-posed concepts of horizontal and vertical 
equity. 
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